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The scoring piece in the farthest right column compares Excess move with the momentum into the print, and the Excess move compares the stock reaction with the underlying earnings revisions:

In the above, AMD is rated a deep red Sell because of the outrageous momentum into the print and the also outrageous stock reaction in excess of the underlying fundamentals changes. It’s not going to be perfect, but it should give you a guide for what to do with positions.

Thoughts? I plan to publish these either each weekend or on a rolling daily basis looking at earnings reactions from 3-5 days prior to catch the full earnings ‘drift’ + full sell side estimate update cycle.

Here’s another sector specific table for Semis:

Please comment!

Idea would be to highlight names that had dramatic share price reactions without much shifting in the underlying financial forecasts (or vice versa).

I think this makes the most sense at the end of the week? or maybe daily, after 24H of price discovery digestion? TBD - maybe even both.

If you have any thoughts about what to include, or how to display this visually, please share. I think at a minimum I would look at price change vs. change in forward 1-year and 2-year:

• Revenue

• Gross margin

• Operating margin

• EPS

• FCF (but noting that sell-side cash flow models are atrocious, especially talking 13-24mo out)

Hell, maybe I even include more niche metrics like DAUs, ARPU, GMV, Billings, and RPOs.

Short Interest Leaders

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Why on earth did Trump’s account buy KRUS?

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Here’s the top of the list:

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Here are the largest eligible names not in an index - there is a very clear favorite here:

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1. The Mirror Acquisition (2020, fallout through 2023) Lululemon spent roughly $500 million on connected-fitness platform Mirror during the peak of the pandemic, when at-home fitness was booming. The bet fell apart quickly as gym-goers returned to in-person workouts. By Q4 2022, the company took a $442.7 million post-tax impairment charge, effectively writing off almost the entire investment. Founder Chip Wilson later singled out the deal as a prime example of the board’s poor judgment. By the end of 2021, Lululemon had already slashed Mirror’s revenue outlook by half, projecting $125-130 million instead of the original $250-275 million forecast.

2. The Breezethrough Leggings Disaster (July 2024) Lululemon pulled its $98 Breezethrough leggings from its website and app after customers flooded social media with complaints about an unflattering V-shaped back seam. The seam ran from the seat all the way up to the lower back, and customers described it as creating a “whale tail” look. The product was scrapped just weeks after launch, raising serious questions about whether the company’s design and quality testing processes had broken down.

3. The “Get Low” Collection Fiasco (January 2026) Only 17 months after Breezethrough, Lululemon launched the “Get Low” workout line, which was immediately criticized by customers as see-through, lacking compression, and poorly designed. The company pulled the collection from its U.S. website within days of release. When Lululemon re-listed the products, it told customers to size up and wear skin-tone seamless underwear underneath. Founder Chip Wilson called the pullback “clearly a total operational failure” and said the company had “completely lost its way as a leader in technical apparel.”

4. The Disney Collaboration Lululemon launched a collaboration with Walt Disney Co. (where CEO McDonald sat on the board), which was widely mocked on social media as “a random collab” and “basic AF.” Wilson later claimed the Disney deal, along with other missteps, contributed to the destruction of $10 billion in market cap. The partnership confused brand loyalists who associated Lululemon with serious athletic performance, not character-branded leisurewear.

5. The Team Canada Olympic Uniforms (Summer 2024) Lululemon designed Team Canada’s kit for the 2024 Paris Olympics, and the uniforms drew widespread backlash, with critics comparing the red-dotted pattern to blood stains and uncooked bacon. While marketing experts argued the controversy would not hurt sales long-term, the reputational hit added to a growing narrative that Lululemon’s design sense was adrift.

6. Stale Product Assortment and Over-Reliance on Legacy Styles CEO McDonald himself admitted in September 2024 that the brand had “become too predictable within our casual offerings” and that seasonal colors were not performing as expected. The company acknowledged that letting product life cycles run too long contributed to softness in the U.S. business, with newness penetration sitting at just 23% of the overall assortment when it needed to be at 35%. This staleness opened the door for competitors like Alo Yoga, Vuori, and SET Active to chip away at Lululemon’s core customer base.

7. The Velvet Product Line Lululemon introduced velvet and crushed velvet versions of its core products starting around 2019-2020, including the Wunder Lounge tights and Warm Down crews. A “We Made Too Much” velvet section on the website suggests that inventory of these items did not sell through as planned. The velvet push represented a broader pattern of chasing lifestyle/fashion trends rather than doubling down on the technical athletic fabrics the brand was known for. As analysts and Wilson have noted, this kind of category drift diluted Lululemon’s identity and made it harder for loyal customers to understand what the brand stood for.

8. Loss of Chief Design Officer Sun Choe (2024) The departure of Design Director Sun Choe in 2024 left the brand without a clear creative leader at a time when product quality and design innovation were already under fire. Multiple commentators have pointed to this loss as a turning point that accelerated the brand’s design struggles and contributed to failures like Breezethrough and Get Low.

Taken together, these decisions reflect a company that drifted from its technical athletic roots, struggled with product quality control, chased pandemic-era trends, and diluted its brand identity through off-strategy partnerships. The brand’s core identity has been diluted by inconsistent design and expansion into non-core categories, resulting in alienation of loyal customers, mounting competitive pressures, and a business in clear decline.

What can be done? Let’s take a look…

Executive Summary

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I am starting with what I have on the shelf, not what I think is most useful. Please comment with additional industry requests and / or names to add to this existing lists.

Semiconductor Ecosystem

Restaurants

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Examples for Tesla and UnitedHealth below:

Looking at the data heading into Q1’26, the setup leans short (or at minimum, stay away). Here’s why:

Valuation is stretched. The 14.7x forward P/S is the highest in the entire table — above even the Q3’25 print (14.4x) which only got a +2.3% reaction despite a beat. You’re paying peak multiple into the print.

Relative performance has already faded. Down 983 bps vs. SPY since last quarter, which historically has been a mixed signal — but combined with the elevated valuation, it suggests the stock has given back some froth without getting cheap.

Forward growth estimates are uninspiring. NTM Rev growth at 7.6% and NTM EPS growth at 10.9% are near the lowest in the table. You’re paying the highest multiple for the weakest forward growth setup — that’s a bad combination.

The pattern on beats at high multiples isn’t great. Q3’24 (6.2x, +20.8% beat → +21.9%) worked because the multiple was compressed. Q4’22 at 4.3x got +11%. But when the multiple has been elevated (Q4’25 at 13.5x, beat of 11.9% → -3.5%; Q2’25 at 10.4x → -8.2%), beats haven’t been rewarded.

Short interest at 2.0% is low, so there’s no squeeze fuel to bail out longs on a miss.

Options are implying ±4.0%, so the market isn’t pricing in a huge move — but the risk/reward skews negative given the valuation/growth mismatch. A miss or even a meet could easily take it down 4-8%, while a beat at this multiple may get sold into (as Q4’25 showed).

The cleanest expression is probably a short or a put spread into the print, with the thesis that the multiple doesn’t deserve to expand further without a material growth re-acceleration.

This one’s interesting — it leans long, but with caveats. Here’s the read:

Valuation has compressed meaningfully. 18.2x forward P/E is well off the 20-22x range it traded at through most of 2022-2023, and down from the 21.9x at Q3’25. At 83% vs. SPY, that’s the cheapest relative valuation since Q2’24 (75%) — and that quarter got a +5.2% reaction on a 4.9% beat.

The stock has been outperforming into the print. +932 bps vs. SPY is a strong run, which could cut both ways — but historically UNH has been rewarded when it comes in hot with a compressed multiple. Q1’25 (+2,704 bps, 19.0x P/E → +22.4%) and Q2’23 (-2,156 bps but 17.1x → +7.2%) show the pattern.

NTM Rev growth at (1.6%) is the red flag. That’s the worst in the entire table — negative forward revenue growth is ugly for a name that’s reliably grown top-line 7-12%. NTM EPS at 9.5% is fine but not exciting. If that negative rev growth estimate is right, it could cap upside.

The Q4’25 disaster is the elephant in the room. -19.6% on a 0.4% beat at 20.0x — that was a blowup driven by the medical cost ratio / guidance issues, not the beat/miss itself. The question is whether that risk has been repriced at 18.2x and 83% relative.

Consensus revisions aren’t visible yet for Q1’26, but the prior pattern shows analysts have been cutting — the stock is trading like expectations have been reset.

Short interest at 2.0% is elevated for UNH (historically 0.5-1.5%), which adds squeeze potential on an upside surprise.

Options imply ±5.5%, and the stock is trading well above both the 200D and 50D (+3.8%/+13.4%), suggesting momentum support.

The bull case: Expectations and valuation have been reset after the Q4’25 blowup, the stock has been recovering, and a clean print with stabilizing medical cost trends could squeeze shorts and push it 5-8% higher. The compressed relative valuation gives you a margin of safety you rarely get with UNH.

The risk: If medical cost pressures persist or guidance disappoints again, the Q4’25 playbook repeats and the +932 bps run gets unwound.

Net, I’d lean long — the valuation reset and elevated short interest tilt the risk/reward favorably, but I’d size it smaller than normal given the tail risk from the cost ratio narrative.

More than a few Twitter personalities said this with a mixture of sincerity and sarcasm after the 8PM ET Friday announcement from Nasdaq that SanDisk (SNDK) would replace Atlassian (TEAM) in the Nasdaq-100 (link).

Why? Well let’s take a look at an all too familiar stock (for most), Super Micro Computer (SMCI).

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For now, the growth rate somewhat (arguably) matches the valuation, as it remains closer to the trendline than Cloudflare. But what if Claude is about to completely derail the next 2-3 years of growth? Let’s dive in…

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One candidate sticks out like a sore thumb:

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Take a look at SoFi’s odds below:

The problem?

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First, a few changes to the data within the tables:

• Adding next twelve months’ EPS/revenue growth: This would contextualize either the price-to-earnings/price-to-sales ratios. Does near-term growth match the multiple?

• Adding a ‘multiple premium/discount’ column: This would track the relative performance of a company’s multiple vs. the aggregate SPY multiple over time. Maybe now Microsoft is 20x forward earnings vs. SPY 18x forward earnings, but last quarter Microsoft was 25x and SPY was 15x. This better contextualizes a given multiple for the user.

Second, written contextualization of the Setup table, and three bullet points each for the Bull and Bear narratives for each company.

Here’s the ‘Names of Note’ piece I just shared, rewritten with these additions. Yes, this leans heavily into AI, and this is a quick-and-dirty first take that I will improve with better models, better prompts, and improved linguistic style. Please consider the format / approach more so than the content detail.

Broadcom (AVGO)

📊 Synopsis

Broadcom has been an AI infrastructure powerhouse, growing from a ~27x forward P/E in early 2024 to a peak near 44x in Q4’25 before normalizing back to the low 30s. The stock has generally outperformed SPY across most recent quarters — note the frequent positive ‘vs. SPY’ readings. Post-earnings reactions have been volatile, with a painful -11.4% in Q4’25 driven by margin compression concerns despite a revenue beat. EPS beats have been consistent and strong, though NTM estimates moved modestly. The options market prices in ±8.1% for Q1’26, and analysts remain strongly bullish into the March 4 earnings report.

🐂 Bull Case

• Custom AI ASIC dominance: Broadcom’s hyperscaler AI chip partnerships (Google, Meta, Apple, Microsoft) are generating $50B+ in projected AI revenue for 2026 — a massive, durable moat as cloud giants prioritize proprietary silicon over off-the-shelf GPUs.

• VMware flywheel fully spinning: The $69B acquisition has integrated ahead of schedule, converting VMware’s perpetual license base into high-margin recurring software revenue that now accounts for ~25% of total revenue with minimal incremental cost.

• Valuation reset creates entry: After correcting from ~$415 ATHs to ~$330, AVGO trades at a more reasonable ~31x forward P/E for a business growing revenue 28%+ YoY with 68% EBITDA margins — an attractive risk/reward that JPMorgan named a top semiconductor pick.

🐻 Bear Case

• Margin compression is real: Management flagged near-term gross margin pressure due to hardware mix shift (AI chips carry lower margins than software), alongside a 2026 tax rate increase — the exact combination that caused the -11% post-earnings collapse in December.

• China export risk and customer concentration: A meaningful portion of AVGO’s chip revenue is exposed to geopolitical risk from U.S.-China trade tensions, while hyperscaler customer concentration means a single contract loss or budget shift could materially dent AI revenue.

Premium valuation leaves no room for error: At ~31x forward earnings and ~15x sales on AI-elevated expectations, any miss or guidance reduction — particularly around AI custom chip ramp timelines — risks multiple contraction in a market already sensitive to tech valuations.

Alibaba Group Holding (BABA)

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Sumitomo Forestry just announced that they will acquire Tri Pointe Homes (TPH) for $4.3B cash (TPH market cap at Friday close was $3.1B, enterprise value $3.5B).

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When you start looking further out - say to building products (MAS, FBIN, TREX, etc.), DIY retailers (HD, LOW, FND, etc.), furniture names (RH, WSM, W, etc.), or brokerage / housing tech (COMP, ZG, OPEN, etc.) - you end up with considerable opportunities to trade laggard names.

Why does this opportunity to trade names that fail to price in news in real-time exist to such an extent? My best theory is that the most sophisticated housing investors are all directly invested in the primary asset class: real estate. Add to that the fact that few to no institutions have pure housing analysts or PMs (with most covering a much broader swath of industrials), and you end up with exceptional opportunities to scalp returns over short time horizons.

Let me give you an example situation to look for Tuesday, and then I’ll provide data supporting trades across every sector tied to housing.

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Are these moves appropriate? Where should investors and traders expect the stocks to close the day on Monday and on December 22nd?

This post provides you with nearly a decade of history across 47 precedent index changes, including the following for each:

• The next day percentage reaction following the announcement,

• The second day percentage reaction following the announcement,

• The cumulative reaction from announcement to rebalance date,

• The market cap at announcement,

• The 30-day return into the announcement (for analyzing front-running),

• Free float data, and

• Short interest data.

We also provide our summary of what we view are the influencing factors determining the stock move.

First, the summary data (also available in a downloadable Excel file at the base of this post):

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